As the Central African Republic’s (CAR) general elections are quickly approaching — anticipated to be held in December of this year — current president Faustin-Archange Touadéra eyes a third term, following a “referendum” that removes term limits and extends each term from five to seven years. Amongst this background of recent democratic backsliding in the CAR, Rwanda and Russia have entrenched their military and economic influence as partners of the Touadéra regime.
Touadéra has not yet declared his candidacy for the presidential elections, though many Central African observers believe that he will likely win the election. “There is not a lot of suspense,” said Charles Bouëssel, an analyst at the International Crisis Group. “There is a 99% chance that Touadéra will be re-elected.” As their respective influences in the country continue to expand, Rwanda and Russia likely will both support the Touadéra regime.
Decades of violence and peacekeeping failure
Prior to Touadéra’s election in 2016, the CAR was embroiled in decades of violence and civil conflict. After gaining independence in 1960, political instability has resulted in six coups. Following former CAR leader François Bozizé’s 2003 coup and attempts to maintain peace in the country, Muslim armed groups — known as Seleka forces — overthrew the Bozizé regime in 2013. In response to Seleka violence, “anti-balaka” Christian fighters have since provoked a conflict that has killed and internally displaced thousands.
The humanitarian crisis has continually expanded since 2013. In June 2023, 3.4 million people required humanitarian aid, while gender-based violence remained extremely prevalent. Neighboring conflicts in Sudan have caused an influx of over 31,000 refugees to CAR, increasing pressure on aid workers to provide services. Ongoing violence contributes to a death rate that is more than twice as high as that of any other country.
In April 2014, the UN Security Council established a peacekeeping mission termed the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The ongoing mission includes over 18,000 soldiers from the African Union — which includes Rwanda — and France. Despite this, conflict in the region continued to escalate even after the arrival of peacekeepers and the signing of peace deals in 2017 and 2019, significantly limiting the power of the Touadéra regime to its capital of Bangui.
While the UN peacekeeping mission has seen limited success in maintaining regional stability, Russian paramilitary group Wagner has become an increasingly relevant partner to the CAR government since 2018. Following rebel attacks on the capital in 2021, the Touadéra government has worked with additional Rwandan forces and Wagner to slowly retake the western part of the country, though rebels still maintain control over other regions.
Foreign influence in the CAR
As both Wagner and the Rwandan armed forces became increasingly involved in the CAR, the two forces conflicted over their respective roles in managing regional stability. “It was not clear what was the job of each partner,” said Bouëssel. “And President Touadéra wasn’t really making a decision to say, OK, Rwanda takes this area, and Russia takes that one.” Over the years, the roles of each faction have grown more distinct. Wagner administers Touadéra’s personal security and military operations in rebel-controlled areas, while Rwandan troops train forces in the capital, Bangui, and near the CAR-Democratic Republic of the Congo border.
Across Africa, Rwanda is increasingly involving itself in the affairs of its neighbors through peacekeeping missions and military “interventions” across countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, and South Sudan.
Within the CAR, Rwanda is present in all aspects of the economy and parts of Central African society. As peacekeepers clean Bangui neighborhoods and Rwandans open restaurants and clothing stores, annual events now commemorate the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Experts say that this soft-power initiative focuses on similarities between the protracted crises in both the CAR and Rwanda, showing how Rwanda is uniquely capable of rebuilding after sociopolitical conflict.
However, in the words of Bouëssel, “Rwanda has less direct influence over the president because they don’t have the same proximity to him, nor the same methods and the same leverage as Wagner.” Wagner operatives similarly focus on gold and diamond mines, seeking to derive economic benefit from their mercenary work.
‘A fight for the republic’: the declining state of democracy in the CAR
Both foreign powers heavily involved in the CAR do not have an interest in democracy. According to Freedom House in 2022, Rwanda is not free, as civil and political rights are heavily limited. In a likely manipulated election, sitting Rwandan President Paul Kagame took 98.8 percent of the vote, according to official results. Meanwhile, Wagner — albeit a private organization — similarly represents Russia, a “consolidated authoritarian regime,” per Freedom House.
As the CAR approaches its first presidential election in thirty-five years after its postponement due to security concerns, opponents continue to accuse Touadéra of rigging the election. Meanwhile, representatives of MINUSCA have avoided discussions of election fairness, but have promised to “mobilise broad and safe participation [in the election], particularly of women.” Western partners hesitate to fund the election, citing armed opposition groups that could disrupt the democratic process.
Beyond the significant expansion of presidential power following a referendum with a turnout as low as 10%, the Touadéra regime is actively imprisoning and suppressing political opposition to his potential third term. As members of the opposition coalition, the Republican Bloc for the Defense of the Constitution, will continue protesting the election in following weeks, they face judicial harassment, travel bans, and unlawful arrest. In January, two brothers of opposition presidential candidate Henri-Marie Dondra were arrested on allegations of conspiracy to poison the president.
For the millions of Central Africans caught in the cycle of violence, displacement, and political disenfranchisement, the December election offers little promise of change. With the declining ability of MINUSCA to provide peace, security, or humanitarian aid, foreign powers with little interest in human rights increasingly seek to monopolize “peacekeeping” in their favor. The Central African Republic’s upcoming election risks being more of a coronation than a competition.