Following decades of protracted conflict between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a deal brokered in Washington aims to bring both peace and American mineral interests into the region. The conflict has spanned over thirty years and constitutes one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world, with widespread violence in hospitals and displacement sites. Though U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that “the entire region begins a new chapter of hope and opportunity, harmony, prosperity and peace,” fighting in the region is not anticipated to stop, as the deal does not include M23, the largest rebel group in the conflict, supported by Rwanda.
A protracted, complex, serious humanitarian crisis
In 1994, Rwanda was composed of three primary ethnic groups, the largest of which—the Hutu—comprised a majority of more than 80 percent. Following years of ethnic conflict with the Tutsi brought on by Belgian colonization, governance policies, and later civil war, the extremist Hutu government murdered nearly one million Tutsi and moderate Hutus in what is now known as the Rwandan Genocide.
The conflict spilled over into the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo, as nearly two million Hutu refugees entered the country. A small portion of the ethnic Hutu espoused extremist beliefs and began organizing local militias and Tutsi groups similarly organized in response. Following the defeat of the extremist Hutu government, the new Tutsi-led government led by Paul Kagame launched an invasion of the DRC (then called Zaire), triggering the First Congo War (1996-1997). Kagame justified the war by accusing the Congolese government of harboring Hutu extremists and other threats to Rwandan national security.
Following the end of the First Congo War, Laurent Kabila became the president of the DRC, emerging as a key ally to the Kagame regime during the war. However, following accusations that Kabila was a “puppet” figure for the Rwandan government to maintain control over the DRC, diplomatic relations between Rwanda and the DRC deteriorated significantly. As Kabila permitted Hutu militant groups to organize in the border regions of North and South Kivu, Rwanda launched the Second Congo War (1998-2003) alongside militant groups backed by Uganda and other state actors.
The Second Congo War laid the foundations for one of the world’s most significant and long-lasting humanitarian crises. In the decade following 1998, a survey by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) counted over 5.4 million deaths as a result of the Second Congo War and resulting conflicts, a number that continues to increase due to continued violence, malnutrition, and the spread of disease. Following the formal end of the war in 2003, rebel groups including M23 backed by Rwanda continue to perpetrate state-supported violence in border regions including Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu.
As of 2022, armed conflicts in East Congo have displaced over 4.6 million people, with bombings on civilian infrastructure including hospitals and shelters. Though the Ebola crisis has since diminished, diseases including cholera, malaria, measles, meningitis, monkeypox and tuberculosis continue to spread. Women and girls face rape and gender-based violence at ever-increasing rates, while pregnant individuals do not have access to adequate healthcare. The humanitarian crisis in the Congo has not seen any sort of resolution in the 27 years since the Second Congo War first began.
Minerals: a 21st-century commodity
While many of the belligerent parties involved in the conflict are local to the region, many international state actors and private entities also have a keen interest in the area. The eastern DRC is extremely rich in mineral resources vital to developing technologies; the DRC produces roughly 70 percent of the world’s cobalt, which is essential to manufacture batteries for electric cars and computers. Other key minerals found in the region, including rare earth metals, play a key role in the development of renewable energy.
Through its various initiatives—including the Belt and Road Initiative—the Chinese government has come to a near-monopoly over regional mining and mineral exports. The initiative, while claiming to support regional infrastructure development through railroad and port construction, has significantly increased investments into mineral-rich countries. During the Cold War, the U.S. federal government sought to defend Congolese mineral resources from Soviet control and thus supplied U.S. mining companies with generous subsidies and aid. However, following the decline of the Soviet Union, while U.S. mining companies previously held significant control over cobalt mines in the area, many have since transferred to China since the DRC’s accession to the Belt and Road partnership.
The Biden administration’s attitude to expanding Chinese energy dominance seems to be reflected in the recent Trump administration-hosted talks between the DRC and Rwanda. As the United States Department of Commerce evaluated the minerals to be roughly $24 trillion in value, various analysts also believe the U.S. government’s commitment to peace may vary on the outcome of mineral-related talks between the United States and the DRC.
Worries over American intentions and interests
While it is clear that economic and foreign policy interests over the sub-Saharan mineral trade have guided the United States’ interest in ending the conflict, peace advocates worry that the deal will fail to prevent the humanitarian crisis from continual descent.
Though M23 rebels are currently negotiating with the DRC government in Qatar over a conclusion to the armed conflict, the group as a whole has suggested that the U.S. peace deal will not apply to them. A spokesperson from the Congo River Alliance (AFC)—a group which includes M23—stated that “anything regarding us which [is] done without us, it’s against us.”
Additionally, while resource rights have been a significant portion of DRC negotiations with the United States government, external observers note that the peace agreement does not provide justice for victims of war crimes and other acts of aggression. In the words of North Kivu activist Hope Muhinuka, “I don’t think the Americans should be trusted 100%. It is up to us to capitalize on all we have now as an opportunity.”
Ultimately, while the Washington-brokered deal may show a renewed interest in restoring peace through diplomacy and regional economic development, the nature of the agreement means it will have a limited direct impact on the millions of lives impacted by ongoing violence, disease, and famine. Though interests in minerals and economic resources take precedence in high-level negotiations, stability in the region requires reconciliation that addresses the primary casus belli of the last thirty years.